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Abstract—Deep Neural Network-based systems are now the
state-of-the-art in many robotics tasks, but their application
in safety-critical domains remains dangerous without formal
guarantees on network robustness. Small perturbations to sensor
inputs (from noise or adversarial examples) are often enough
to change network-based decisions, which was recently shown
to cause an autonomous vehicle to swerve into another lane. In
light of these dangers, numerous algorithms have been developed
as defensive mechanisms from these adversarial inputs, some
of which provide formal robustness guarantees or certificates.
This work leverages research on certified adversarial robustness
to develop an online certified defense for deep reinforcement
learning algorithms. The proposed defense computes guaranteed
lower bounds on state-action values during execution to identify
and choose a robust action under a worst-case deviation in
input space due to possible adversaries or noise. The approach
is demonstrated on a Deep Q-Network policy and is shown
to increase robustness to noise and adversaries in pedestrian
collision avoidance scenarios and a classic control task. This work
extends our previous paper with new performance guarantees,
expanded results aggregated across more scenarios, an extension
into scenarios with adversarial behavior, comparisons with a
more computationally expensive method, and visualizations that
provide intuition about the robustness algorithm.
Index Terms—Adversarial Attacks, Reinforcement Learning,
Collision Avoidance, Robustness Verification
I. INTRODUCTION
DEEP Reinforcement Learning (RL) algorithms haveachieved impressive success on robotic manipulation [2]
and robot navigation in pedestrian crowds [3], [4]. Many of
these systems utilize black-box predictions from Deep Neural
Networks (DNN) to achieve state-of-the-art performance in
prediction and planning tasks. However, the lack of formal
robustness guarantees for DNNs currently limits their appli-
cation in safety-critical domains, such as collision avoidance.
In particular, even subtle perturbations to the input, known
as adversarial examples, can lead to incorrect (but highly-
confident) decisions by DNNs [5]–[7]. Furthermore, several
recent works have demonstrated the danger of adversarial
examples in real-world situations [8], [9], including causing
an autonomous vehicle to swerve into another lane [10]. The
work in this paper not only addresses deep RL algorithms’
lack of robustness against network input uncertainties, but it
also provides formal guarantees in the form of certificates on
the solution quality.
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While there are many techniques for synthesis of empiri-
cally robust deep RL policies [11]–[15], it remains difficult
to synthesize a provably robust neural network. Instead, we
leverage ideas from a related area that provides a guarantee
on how sensitive a trained network’s output is to input pertur-
bations for each nominal input [16]–[21]. A promising recent
set of methods makes such formal robustness analysis tractable
by relaxing the nonlinear constraints associated with network
activations [22]–[28], unified in [29]. These relaxed methods
were previously applied on computer vision/supervised learn-
ing tasks.
This work extends the tools for efficient formal neural
network robustness analysis (e.g., [22], [25], [27]) to deep
RL tasks. In RL, techniques designed for supervised learning
robustness analysis would simply allow a nominal action to
be flagged as non-robust if the minimum input perturbation
exceeds a robustness threshold (e.g., the system’s known level
of uncertainty) – these techniques would not reason about
alternative actions. Hence, we instead focus on the robust
decision-making problem: given a known bound on the input
perturbation, what is the best action to take? This aligns with
the requirement that an agent must select an action at each step
of an RL problem. Our approach uses robust optimization to
consider worst-case uncertainties and provides certificates on
solution quality, making it certifiably robust.
As a motivating example, consider the collision avoidance
setting in Fig. 1, in which an adversary perturbs an agent’s
(orange) observation of an obstacle (blue). An agent follow-
ing a nominal/standard deep RL policy would observe sadv
and select an action, a∗nom, that collides with the obstacle’s
true position, s0, thinking that the space is unoccupied. Our
proposed approach assumes a worst-case deviation of the
observed input, sadv, bounded by , and takes the robust-
optimal action, a∗adv, under that perturbation, to safely avoid the
true obstacle. Robustness analysis algorithms often assume 
is a scalar, which makes sense for image inputs (all pixels have
same scale, e.g., 0−255 intensity). A key challenge in direct
application to RL tasks is that the observation vector (network
input) could have elements with substantially different scales
(e.g., position, angle, joint torques) and associated measure-
ment uncertainties, motivating our extension with vector .
This work contributes (i) the first formulation of certifiably
robust deep RL, which uses robust optimization to consider
worst-case state perturbations and provides certificates on so-
lution quality, (ii) an extension of tools for efficient robustness
analysis to handle variable scale inputs common in RL, and
(iii) demonstrations of increased robustness to adversaries and
sensor noise on cartpole and a pedestrian collision avoidance
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Fig. 1: Intuition. An adversary distorts the true position, s0, of a
dynamic obstacle (blue) into an adversarial observation, sadv. The
agent (orange) only sees the adversarial input, so nominal RL policies
would take a∗nom to reach the goal quickly, but would then collide
with the true obstacle, s0. The proposed defensive strategy considers
that s0 could be anywhere inside the -ball around sadv, and selects
the action, a∗adv, with the best, worst-case outcome as calculated
by a guaranteed lower bound on the value network output, which
cautiously avoids the obstacle while reaching the goal. Note this is
different from simply inflating the obstacle radius, since the action
values contain information about environment dynamics, e.g., blue
agent’s cooperativeness.
simulation.
We extend our previously published conference paper [1]
with new performance guarantees (Section IV-D), expanded
results aggregated across more scenarios (Sections V-A
and V-B), an extension of the algorithm into scenarios with
adversarial behavior (Section V-D), comparisons with a more
computationally expensive method (Section V-E), and visual-
izations that provide intuition about the robustness algorithm
(Section V-F).
II. RELATED WORK
The lack of robustness of DNNs to real-world uncertain-
ties [5] has motivated the study of adversarial attacks (i.e.,
worst-case uncertainty realizations) in many learning tasks.
This section summarizes adversarial attack and defense models
in deep RL (see [30] for a thorough survey) and describes
methods for formally quantifying DNN robustness.
A. Adversarial Attacks in Deep RL
An adversary can act against an RL agent by influencing (or
exploiting a weakness in) the observation or transition models
of the environment.
Observation model: Many of the techniques for attacking
supervised learning networks through small image perturba-
tions [31] could be used to attack image-based deep RL poli-
cies. Recent works show how to specifically craft adversarial
attacks (in the input image space) against a Deep Q-Network
(DQN) in RL [32], [33]. Another work applies both adversarial
observation and transition perturbations [11].
Transition model: Several approaches attack an RL agent
by changing parameters of the physics simulator, like friction
coefficient or center of gravity, between episodes [12], [13].
Other approaches change the transition model between steps
of episodes, for instance by applying disturbance forces [14],
[15], or by adding a second agent that is competing against the
ego agent [34]. In [35], the second agent unexpectedly learns
to visually distract the ego agent rather than exerting forces
and essentially becomes an observation model adversary. Thus,
adversarial behavior of a second agent (the topic of multiagent
games [36]) introduces complexities beyond the scope of this
work (except a brief discussion in Section V-D), which focuses
on robustness to adversarial observations.
B. Empirical Defenses to Adversarial Attacks
Across deep learning in general, the goal of most existing
robustness methods is to make neural networks’ outputs less
sensitive to small input perturbations.
Supervised Learning: First introduced for supervised learn-
ing tasks, adversarial training or retraining augments the train-
ing dataset with adversaries [37]–[40] to increase robustness
during testing (empirically). Other works increase robustness
through distilling networks [41] or comparing the output of
model ensembles [42]. Rather than modifying the network
training procedure, another type of approach detects adversar-
ial examples through comparing the input with a binary filtered
transformation of the input [43]. Although these approaches
show impressive empirical success, they are often ineffective
against more sophisticated adversarial attacks [44]–[47].
Deep RL: Many ideas from supervised learning were trans-
ferred over to deep RL to provide empirical defenses to
adversaries (e.g., training in adversarial environments [11]–
[15], using model ensembles [12], [13]). Moreover, because
adversarial observation perturbations are a form of measure-
ment uncertainty, there are close connections between Safe
RL [48] and adversarial robustness. Many Safe RL (also
called risk-sensitive RL) algorithms optimize for the reward
under worst-case assumptions of environment stochasticity,
rather than optimizing for the expected reward [49]–[51].
The resulting policies are more risk-sensitive (i.e., robust
to stochastic deviations in the input space, such as sensor
noise), but could still fail on algorithmically crafted adversarial
examples. In other words, modifying the RL training process
to directly synthesize a provably robust neural network remains
challenging.
Instead, this work adds a defense layer on top of an
already trained DQN. We provide guarantees on the robusti-
fied policy’s solution quality by leveraging formal robustness
analysis methods that propagate known DNN input bounds to
guaranteed output bounds.
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Fig. 2: State Uncertainty Propagated Through Deep Q-Network. The red region (left) represents bounded state uncertainty (an L∞ -ball)
around the observed state, sadv. A neural network maps this set of possible inputs to a polytope (red) of possible outputs (Q-values in RL).
This work’s extension of [27] provides an outer bound (blue) on that polytope. This work then modifies the RL action-selection rule by
considering lower bounds, Ql, on the blue region for each action. In this 2-state, 2-action example, our algorithm would select action 2,
since Ql(sadv, a2) > Ql(sadv, a1), i.e. the worst possible outcome from action 2 is better than the worst possible outcome from action 1,
given an -ball uncertainty and a pre-trained DQN.
C. Formal Robustness Methods
Although synthesis of a provably robust neural network is
difficult, there is a closely related body of work that can pro-
vide other formal guarantees on network robustness – namely,
a guarantee on how sensitive a trained network’s output is to
input perturbations. The corresponding mathematical machin-
ery to propagate an input set through a neural network allows
for solving various robustness analysis problems, such as the
calculation of reachable sets, minimal adversarial examples,
or robustness verification.
For example, exact methods can be used to find tight bounds
on the maximum network output deviation, given a nominal
input and bounded input perturbation. These methods rely
on Satisfiability Modulo Theory (SMT) [16]–[18], LP/mixed-
integer LP solvers [19], [20], or zonotopes [21], to propagate
constraints on the input space through to the output space
(exactly). The difficulty in this propagation arises through
DNNs with Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU) or other nonlinear
activation functions – in fact, the problem of finding the
exact output bounds is NP-complete (as shown by [17], [27]),
making real-time implementations infeasible for many robotics
tasks.
The formal robustness analysis approaches can be visualized
in Fig. 2 in terms of a 2-state, 2-action deep RL problem. For a
given state uncertainty set (red, left), the exact methods reason
over the exact adversarial polytope (red, right), i.e., the image
of the state uncertainty set through the network.
To enable scalable analysis, many researchers simultane-
ously proposed various relaxations of the NP-complete for-
mulation: [29] provides a unifying framework of the convex
relaxations that we briefly summarize here. A convex relax-
ation of the nonlinear activations enables the use of a standard
LP solver to compute convex, guaranteed outer bounds, QLP ,
on the adversarial polytope (cf. Problem C in [29]). Even
though this LP can be solved more efficiently than the exact
problem with nonlinear activations, solving the relaxed LP is
still computationally intensive.
Fortunately, the LP can be solved greedily, and thus even
more efficiently, by using just one linear upper bound and one
linear lower bound for each nonlinear layer. Several seemingly
different approaches (e.g., solving the dual problem [22]–
[24], using zonotopes/polyhedra as in [25], [26], using linear
outer bounds [27], [28]) were shown to lead to very similar
or identical network bounds in [29]. These greedy solutions
provide over-approximations (see blue region in Fig. 2) on the
LP solution and thus, also on the adversarial polytope. One of
these methods, Fast-Lin [27] (which this work extends), can
verify an image classification (MNIST) network’s sensitivity
to perturbations for a given image in < 200ms. As new
approaches appear in the literature, it will be straightforward to
“upgrade” this work’s use of [27] for calculating lower bounds.
The analysis techniques described here in Section II-C are
often formulated to solve the robustness verification problem:
determine whether the calculated set of possible network
outputs crosses a decision hyperplane (a line of slope 1
through the origin, in this example) – if it does cross, the
classifier is deemed “not robust” to the input uncertainty. Our
approach instead solves the robust decision-making problem:
determine the best action considering worst-case outcomes,
Ql(sadv, a1), Ql(sadv, a2), denoted by the dashed lines in
Fig. 2.
III. BACKGROUND
A. Preliminaries
In RL problems1, the state-action value (or, “Q-value”)
Q(s, a) = E
[
T∑
t=0
γtr(t)|s(t=0) = s, a(t=0) = a
]
expresses the expected accumulation of future reward, r,
discounted by γ, received by starting in state s ∈ Rn and
taking one of d discrete actions, a ∈ {a0, a1, . . . , ad−1}.
1This work considers problems with a continuous state space and discrete
action space.
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Fig. 3: Illustration of -Ball, Bp(s, ), for n = 2. Let  = [1, 2].
Depending on the choice of Lp norm (e.g., L1, L2, and L∞),
Bp(s, ) is the set of points inside the corresponding colored outline.
The adversary can perturb nominal observation s to any point inside
Bp(s, ). The values of {n, , p} are application-specific choices and
the components of  need not be equal.
Let  ∈ Rn≥0 be the maximum element-wise deviation of the
state vector, and let 1 ≤ p ≤ ∞ parameterize the Lp-norm.
We define the set of states within this deviation as the -Ball,
Bp(s0, ) = {s : lim
′→+
||(s− s0) ′||p ≤ 1}, (1)
where  denotes element-wise division, and the lim is only
needed to handle the case where ∃i i = 0 (e.g., when the
adversary is not allowed to perturb some component of the
state, or the agent knows some component of the state vector
with zero uncertainty).
An -Ball is illustrated in Fig. 3 for the case of n = 2,
highlighting that different elements of the state, si, might have
different perturbation limits, i, and that the choice of Lp-
norm affects the shape of the ball. The Lp-norm is defined as
||x||p = (|x1|p+ . . .+ |xn|p)1/p for x ∈ Rn, 1 ≤ p ≤ ∞.
B. Robustness Analysis
This work aims to find the action that maximizes state-
action value under a worst-case perturbation of the observation
by sensor noise or an adversary. This section explains how to
efficiently obtain a lower bound on the DNN-predicted Q,
given a bounded perturbation in the state space from the true
state. The derivation is based on [27], re-formulated for RL.
The adversary perturbs the true state, s0, to another state,
sadv ∈ Bpadv(s0, adv), within the adv-ball. The ego agent only
observes the perturbed state, sadv. As displayed in Fig. 2, let
the worst-case state-action value, QL, for a given action, aj ,
be
QL(sadv, aj) = min
s∈Bpadv (sadv,adv)
Q(s, aj), (2)
for all states s inside the adv-Ball around the observation,
sadv.
The goal of the analysis is to compute a guaranteed lower
bound, Ql(s, aj), on the minimum state-action value, that
is, Ql(s, aj) ≤ QL(s, aj). The key idea is to pass interval
bounds2 [l(0),u(0)] = [sadv−adv, sadv +adv] from the DNN’s
input layer to the output layer, where l(k) and u(k) denote
the lower and upper bounds of the pre-activation term, z(k),
2Element-wise ±adv can cause overly conservative categorization of
ReLUs for p <∞. p is accounted for later in the Algorithm in Eq. (12).
i.e., l(k)i ≤z(k)i ≤u(k)i ∀i ∈ 1, ..., uk, in the k-th layer with uk
units of an m-layer DNN. When passing interval bounds
through a ReLU activation3, σ(·), the upper and lower pre-
ReLU bounds of each element could either both be positive
(l
(k)
r , u
(k)
r > 0), negative (l
(k)
r , u
(k)
r < 0), or positive and
negative (l(k)r < 0, u
(k)
r > 0), in which the ReLU status is
called active, inactive or undecided, respectively. In the active
and inactive case, bounds are passed directly to the next layer.
In the undecided case, the output of the ReLU is bounded
linearly above and below:
σ(z(k)r )|l(k)r ,u(k)r =

[z
(k)
r , z
(k)
r ]
if l(k)r , u
(k)
r > 0, “active”
[0, 0]
if l(k)r , u
(k)
r < 0, “inactive”
[
u(k)r
u
(k)
r −l(k)r
z
(k)
r ,
u(k)r
u
(k)
r −l(k)r
(z
(k)
r − l(k)r )]
if l(k)r <0, u
(k)
r >0, “undecided”,
(3)
for each element, indexed by r, in the k-th layer.
The identity matrix, D, is introduced as the ReLU status
matrix, H as the lower/upper bounding factor, W as the weight
matrix, b as the bias in layer (k) with r or j as indices, and
the pre-ReLU-activation, z(k)r , is replaced with W
(k)
r,: s+ b
(k)
r .
The ReLU bounding is then rewritten as
D(k)r,r (W
(k)
r,j sj + b
(k)
r )
≤ σ(W (k)r,j sj + b(k)r )
≤ D(k)r,r (W (k)r,j sj + b(k)r −H(k)r,j ),
(4)
where
D(k)r,r =

1 if l(k)r , u
(k)
r >0;
0 if l(k)r , u
(k)
r <0,
u(k)r
u
(k)
r −l(k)r
if l(k)r <0, u
(k)
r >0;
(5)
H
(k)
r,j =
{
l
(k)
r if l
(k)
r <0, u
(k)
r >0, A
(k)
j,r<0;
0 otherwise.
(6)
Using these ReLU relaxations, a guaranteed lower bound of
the state-action value for a single state s ∈ Bp(sadv, ) (based
on [27]) is:
Q¯l(s, aj) = A
(0)
j,: s+ b
(m)
j +
m−1∑
k=1
A
(k)
j,: (b
(k) −H(k):,j ), (7)
where the matrix A contains the network weights and
ReLU activation, recursively for all layers: A(k−1) =
A(k)W (k)D(k−1), with identity in the final layer: A(m) = 1.
Unlike the exact DNN output, the bound on the relaxed
DNN’s output in Eq. (7) can be minimized across an -ball
in closed form (as described in Section IV-C), which is a
key piece of this work’s real-time, robust decision-making
framework.
3Although this work considers DNNs with ReLU activations, the formu-
lation could be extended to general activation functions via more recent
algorithms [28].
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IV. APPROACH
This work develops an add-on, certifiably robust defense
for existing Deep RL algorithms to ensure robustness against
sensor noise or adversarial examples during test time.
A. System architecture
In an offline training phase, an agent uses a deep RL algo-
rithm, here DQN [52], to train a DNN that maps non-corrupted
state observations, s0, to state-action values, Q(s0, a). Ac-
tion selection during training uses the nominal cost function,
a∗nom = argmaxaj Q(s0, aj).
Figure 4 depicts the system architecture of a standard
model-free RL framework with the added-on robustness mod-
ule. During online execution, the agent only receives corrupted
state observations from the environment. The robustness anal-
ysis node uses the DNN architecture, DNN weights, W ,
and robustness hyperparameters, rob, prob, to compute lower
bounds on possible Q-values for robust action selection.
B. Optimal cost function under worst-case perturbation
We assume that the training process causes the network to
converge to the optimal value function, Q∗(s0, a) and focus
on the challenge of handling perturbed observations during
execution. Thus, we consider robustness to an adversary that
perturbs the true state, s0, within a small perturbation, adv,
into the worst-possible state observation, sadv. The adversary
assumes that the RL agent follows a nominal policy (as in,
e.g., DQN) of selecting the action with highest Q-value at the
current observation. A worst possible state observation, sadv,
is therefore any one which causes the RL agent to take the
action with lowest Q-value in the true state, s0:
sadv ∈ {s : s ∈ Bpadv(s0, adv) and
argmax
aj
Q(s, aj) = argmin
aj
Q(s0, aj)}. (8)
This set could be computationally intensive to compute and/or
empty – an approximation is described in Section IV-F.
After the agent receives the state observation picked by the
adversary, the agent selects an action. Instead of trusting the
observation (and thus choosing the worst action for the true
state), the agent could leverage the fact that the true state,
s0, must be somewhere inside an adv-Ball around sadv (i.e.,
s0 ∈ Bpadv(sadv, adv)).
However, in this work, the agent assumes
s0 ∈ Bprob(sadv, rob)), where we make a distinction between
the adversary and robust agent’s parameters. This distinction
introduces hyperparameters rob, prob that provide further
flexibility in the defense algorithm’s conservatism, that do
not necessarily have to match what the adversary applies.
Nonetheless, for the sake of providing guarantees, the rest
of Section IV assumes rob = adv and prob = padv to ensure
Bprob(sadv, rob)) = Bpadv(sadv, adv)). Empirical effects of
tuning rob to other values are explored in Section V.
The agent evaluates each action by calculating the worst-
case Q-value under all possible true states. In accordance with
the robust decision making problem, the robust-optimal action,
a∗, is defined here as one with the highest Q-value under the
worst-case perturbation,
a∗ = argmax
aj
min
s∈Bprob (sadv,rob)
Q(s, aj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
QL(sadv,aj)
. (9)
As described in Section II, computing QL(sadv, aj) exactly is
too computationally intensive for real-time decision-making.
Thus, this work proposes the algorithm Certified
Adversarial Robustness for Deep RL (CARRL). In CARRL,
the action, aCARRL, is selected by approximating QL(sadv, aj)
with Ql(sadv, aj), its guaranteed lower bound across all
possible states s ∈ Bprob(sadv, rob), so that:
aCARRL = argmax
aj
Ql(sadv, aj), (10)
where Eq. (16) below defines Ql(sadv, aj) in closed form.
Conditions for optimality (a∗ = aCARRL) are described in Sec-
tion IV-D.
C. Robustness certification with vector--ball perturbations
To solve Eq. (10) when Q(s, aj) is represented by a
DNN, we adapt the formulation from [27]. Most works in
adversarial examples, including [27], focus on perturbations
on image inputs, in which all channels have the same scale
(e.g., grayscale images with pixel intensities in [0, 255]). More
generally, however, input channels could be on different scales
(e.g., joint torques, velocities, positions). Existing robustness
analysis methods require choosing a scalar rob that bounds
the uncertainty across all input channels; in general, this could
lead to unnecessarily conservative behavior, as some network
inputs might be known with zero uncertainty, or differences in
units could make uncertainties across channels incomparable.
Hence, this work computes bounds on the network output
under perturbation bounds specific to each network input
channel, as described in a vector rob with the same dimension
as s.
To do so, we minimize Q¯l(s, aj) across all states in
Bprob(sadv, rob), where Q¯l(s, aj) was defined in Eq. (7)
as the lower bound on the Q-value for a particular state
s ∈ Bprob(sadv, rob). This derivation uses a vector rob (instead
of scalar rob as in [27]):
Ql(sadv, aj) = min
s∈Bp(sadv,rob)
(
Q¯l(s, aj)
)
(11)
= min
s∈Bp(sadv,rob)
(
A
(0)
j,: s+
b
(m)
j +
m−1∑
k=1
A
(k)
j,: (b
(k) −H(k):,j )︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:Γ

(12)
= min
s∈Bp(sadv,rob)
(
A
(0)
j,: s
)
+ Γ (13)
= min
y∈Bp(0,1)
(
A
(0)
j,: (y  rob)
)
+A
(0)
j,: sadv + Γ
(14)
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Fig. 4: System Architecture. During online execution, an agent observes a state, sadv, corrupted by an adversary or noise process (constrained
to sadv ∈ Bpadv(s0, adv). A trained Deep RL algorithm, e.g., DQN [52], predicts the state-action values, Q. The robustness analysis module
computes a lower bound of the network’s predicted state-action values of each discrete action: Ql, w.r.t. a robustness threshold rob and
Lprob -norm in the input space. The agent takes the action, aCARRL, that maximizes the lower bound, i.e., is best under a worst-case deviation
in the input space, and returns a certificate bounding aCARRL’s sub-optimality.
= min
y∈Bp(0,1)
(
(rob A(0)j,: )y
)
+A
(0)
j,: sadv + Γ
(15)
= −||rob A(0)j,: ||q +A(0)j,: sadv + Γ, (16)
with  denoting element-wise multiplication. From Eq. (11)
to Eq. (12), we substitute in Eq. (7). From Eq. (12) to Eq. (13),
we introduce the placeholder variable Γ that does not de-
pend on s. From Eq. (13) to Eq. (14), we substitute
s := y  rob + sadv, to shift and re-scale the observation to
within the unit ball around zero, y ∈ Bp(0,1). The maximiza-
tion in Eq. (15) is equivalent to a Lq-norm in Eq. (16) by the
definition of the dual norm ||z||q = {sup zTy : ||y||p ≤ 1}
and the fact that the Lq norm is the dual of the Lp norm for
p, q ∈ [1,∞) (with 1/p+ 1/q = 1). Equation (16) is inserted
into Eq. (10) to calculate the CARRL action in closed form.
Recall from Section II that the bound Ql is the greedy (one
linear upper and lower bound per activation) solution of an
LP that describes a DNN with ReLU activations. In this work,
we refer to the full (non-greedy) solution to the primal convex
relaxed LP as QLP (cf. Problem C, LP-All in [29]).
To summarize, the relationship between each of the Q-value
terms is:
Q(sadv, aj) ≥ QL(sadv, aj) ≥ QLP (sadv, aj) ≥ Ql(sadv, aj)
(17)
Q(sadv, aj) ≥ Q¯l(sadv, aj) ≥ Ql(sadv, aj). (18)
D. Guarantees on Action Selection
1) Avoiding a Bad Action: Unlike the nominal DQN rule,
which could be tricked to take an arbitrarily bad action, the
robust-optimal decision-rule in Eq. (9) can avoid bad actions
provided there is a better alternative in the rob-Ball.
Claim 1: If for some q′, ∃s′ ∈ Bprob(sadv, rob), a′ s.t.
Q(s′, a′) ≤ q′ and ∃a′′ s.t. ∀s ∈ Bprob(sadv, rob) Q(s, a′′) >
q′, then a∗ 6= a′.
In other words, if action a′ is sufficiently bad for some
nearby state, s′, and at least one other action a′′ is bet-
ter for all nearby states, the robust-optimal decision rule
will not select the bad action a′ (but DQN might). This
is because QL(sadv, a′) ≤ q′, QL(sadv, a′′) > q′ ⇒
argmaxaj QL(sadv, aj) 6= a′.
2) Matching the Robust-Optimal Action: While Claim 1
refers to the robust-optimal action, the action returned by
CARRL is the same as the robust-optimal action (returned
by a system that can compute the exact lower bounds) under
certain conditions,
argmax
aj
Ql(sadv, aj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
aCARRL
?
= argmax
aj
QL(sadv, aj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
a∗
. (19)
Claim 2: CARRL selects the robust-optimal action if the
robustness analysis process satisfies Ql = g(QL), where g is a
strictly monotonic function, where Ql, QL are written without
their arguments, sadv, aj . A special case of this conditions is
when the analysis returns a tight bound, i.e., Ql(sadv, aj) =
QL(sadv, aj). Using the Fast-Lin-based approach in this work,
for a particular observation, confirmation that all of the ReLUs
are “active” or “inactive” in Eq. (3) would provide a tightness
guarantee.
In cases where Claim 2 is not fulfilled, but Claim 1 is
fulfilled, CARRL is not guaranteed to select the robust-optimal
action, but will still reason about all possible outcomes, and
empirically selects a better action than a nominal policy across
many settings explored in Section V.
Note that when rob = 0, no robustness is applied, so both
the CARRL and robust-optimal decisions reduce to the DQN
decision, since Ql(sadv, aj) = QL(sadv, aj) = Q(sadv, aj).
Claim 3: CARRL provides a certificate of the chosen
action’s sub-optimality,
0 ≤ Q(s0, a∗)−Q(s0, aCARRL)
≤
(
max
a
Qu(sadv, a)
)
−Ql(sadv, aCARRL)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Sub-optimality Certificate
, (20)
where Qu is an upper bound on Q computed analogously to
Ql.
This bound captures the uncertainty in the true state (con-
sidering the whole -ball through Qu, Ql), and the unknown
action a∗ that is optimal for the true state.
We clarify the meaning of certifiably robust in Section A.
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E. Probabilistic Robustness
The discussion so far considered cases where the state
perturbation is known to be bounded (as in, e.g., many
adversarial observation perturbation definitions [31], stochastic
processes with finite support. However, in many other cases,
the observation uncertainty is best modeled by a distribution
with infinite support (e.g., Gaussian). To be fully robust to this
class of uncertainty (including very low probability events)
CARRL requires setting rob,i = ∞ for the unbounded state
elements, si.
For instance, for a Gaussian sensor model with known
standard deviation of measurement error, σsensor, one could
set rob = 2σsensor to yield actions that account for the
worst-case outcome with 95% confidence. In robotics applica-
tions, for example, σsensor is routinely provided in a sensor
datasheet. Implementing this type of probabilistic robustness
only requires a sensor model for the observation vector and a
desired confidence bound to compute the corresponding rob.
F. Adversaries
To evaluate the learned policy’s robustness to deviations of
the input in an adv-Ball, we pass the true state, s0, through an
adversarial/noise process to compute sadv, as seen in Fig. 4.
Computing an adversarial state sadv exactly, using Eq. (8),
is computationally intensive. Instead, we use a Fast Gradient
Sign method with Targeting (FGST) [8] to approximate the
adversary from Eq. (8). FGST chooses a state sˆadv on the
L∞ adv-Ball’s perimeter to encourage the agent to take the
nominally worst action, argminaj Q(s0, aj). Specifically, sˆadv
is picked along the direction of sign of the lowest cross-entropy
loss, L, between yadv, a one-hot encoding of the worst action
at s0, and ynom, the softmax of all actions’ Q-values at s0.
The loss is taken w.r.t. the proposed observation s:
yadv = [1{ai = argminajQ(s0, aj)}] ∈ Ud (21)
Qnom = [Q(s0, aj)∀j ∈ {0, . . . , d− 1}] ∈ Rd (22)
ynom = softmax(Qnom) ∈ ∆d (23)
sˆadv = s0 − adv  sign(∇sL(yadv,ynom)), (24)
where Ud denotes a one-hot vector of dimension d, and ∆d
denotes the standard d-simplex.
In addition to adversarial perturbations, Section V
also considers uniform noise perturbations, where
sadv ∼ Unif ([s0 − σ, s0 + σ]).
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The key result is that while imperfect observations reduce
the performance of a nominal deep RL algorithm, our pro-
posed algorithm, CARRL, recovers much of the performance
by adding robustness during execution. Robustness against
perturbations from an adversary or noise process during
execution is evaluated in two simulated domains: collision
avoidance among dynamic, decision-making obstacles [53]
and cartpole [54]. This section also describes the impact
of the rob hyperparameter, the ability to handle behavioral
adversaries, a comparison with another analysis technique, and
provides intuition on the tightness of the lower bounds.
A. Collision Avoidance Domain
Among the many RL tasks, a particularly challenging
safety-critical task is collision avoidance for a robotic vehicle
among pedestrians. Because learning a policy in the real world
is dangerous and time consuming, this work uses a gym-
based [54] kinematic simulation environment [53] for learning
pedestrian avoidance policies. In this work, the RL policy
controls one of two agents with 11 discrete actions: change
of heading angle evenly spaced between [−pi/6,+pi/6] and
constant velocity v = 1 m/s. The environment executes the
selected action under unicycle kinematics, and controls the
other agent from a diverse set of fixed policies (static, non-
cooperative, ORCA [55], GA3C-CADRL [4]). The sparse
reward is 1 for reaching the goal, −0.25 for colliding (and
0 otherwise, i.e., zero reward is received in cases where the
agent does not reach its goal in a reasonable amount of time).
The observation vector includes the CARRL agent’s goal,
each agent’s radius, and the other agent’s x-y position and
velocity, with more detail in [4]. In this domain, robustness and
perturbations are applied only on the measurement of the other
agent’s x-y position (i.e., rob = rob · [0 . . . 0 1 1 0 . . . 0]) –
an example of CARRL’s ability to handle uncertainties of
varying scales.
A non-dueling DQN policy was trained with 2, 64-unit
layers with the following hyperparameters: learning rate
2.05e−4, -greedy exploration ratio linearly decaying from
0.5 to 0.05, buffer size 152e3, 4e5 training steps, and target
network update frequency, 10e3. The hyperparameters were
found by running 100 iterations of Bayesian optimization with
Gaussian Processes [56] on the maximization of the sparse
training reward.
After training, CARRL is added onto the trained DQN pol-
icy. Intuition on the resulting CARRL policy is demonstrated
in Fig. 5. The figure shows the trajectories of the CARRL
agent (orange) for increasing rob values in a scenario with
unperturbed observations. With increasing rob (toward right),
the CARRL agent accounts for increasingly large worst-case
perturbations of the other agent’s position. Accordingly, the
agent avoids the dynamic agent (blue) increasingly conserva-
tively, i.e., selects actions that leave a larger safety distance.
When rob=2.0, the CARRL agent is overly conservative – it
“runs away” and does not reach its goal, which is explained
more in Section V-F.
Figure 6 shows that the nominal DQN policy is not robust
to the perturbation of inputs. In particular, increasing the
magnitude of adversarial, or noisy perturbation, adv, σunif,
drastically 1) increases the average number of collisions (as
seen in Figs. 6a and 6d, respectively, at rob = 0) and 2)
decreases the average reward (as seen in Figs. 6b and 6e).
The results in Fig. 6 are evaluated in scenarios where the
other agent is non-cooperative (i.e., travels straight to its goal
position at constant velocity) and each datapoint represents the
average of 100 trials across 5 random seeds that determine the
agents’ initial/goal positions and radii (shading represents ±1
standard deviation of average value per seed).
Next, we demonstrate that CARRL recovers performance.
Increasing the robustness parameter rob decreases the number
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(a) rob = 0.0 (b) rob = 0.1 (c) rob = 0.46 (d) rob = 1.0 (e) rob = 2.0
Fig. 5: Increase of conservatism with rob. An agent (orange) following the CARRL policy avoids a dynamic, non-cooperative obstacle (blue)
that is observed without noise. An increasing robustness parameter rob (left to right) increases the agent’s conservatism, i.e., the agent avoids
the obstacle with a greater safety distance.
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Fig. 6: Robustness against adversarial attacks (top row) and noise (bottom row). Increasing the robustness parameter, rob, decreases the
number of collisions in the presence of adversarial attacks (a), or noise (d) for various perturbation magnitudes, adv, σunif. CARRL also
recovers substantial amounts of reward lost due to imperfect observations as rob increases (b,e). The choice of rob to maximize reward in
the presence of a particular adversary or noise process can be guided by the models in (c,f). When rob = 0, CARRL is equivalent to DQN.
of collisions under varying magnitudes of noise, or adversarial
attack, as seen in Figs. 6a and 6d. Because collisions affect
the reward function, the received reward also increases with
an increasing robustness parameter rob<∼0.1 under varying
magnitudes of perturbations. As expected, the effect of the
proposed defense is highest under large perturbations, as seen
in the slopes of the curves adv=0.23 (violet) and σunif=0.5
(gray).
Since the CARRL agent selects actions more conservatively
than a nominal DQN agent, it is able to successfully reach
its goal instead of colliding like a nominal DQN agent does
under many scenarios with noisy or adversarial perturbations.
However, the effect of overly conservative behavior seen
in Figs. 5d and 5e appears in Fig. 6 for rob> ∼ 0.2, as
the reward drops significantly. This excessive conservatism
for large rob can be partially explained by the fact that
highly conservative actions may move the agent’s position
observation into states that are far from what the network was
trained on, which breaks CARRL’s assumption of a perfectly
learned Q-function. Further discussion about the conservatism
inherent in the lower bounds is discussed in Section V-F.
Figures 6c and 6f illustrate further intuition on choosing
rob. Figure 6c demonstrates a strong correlation between the
attack magnitude adv and the best (i.e., reward-maximizing)
robustness hyperparameter rob under that attack magnitude
from Fig. 6b. In the case of uniform noise, the correlation
between rob and σunif is weaker, because the FGST adversary
chooses an input state on the perimeter of the adv-Ball,
whereas uniform noise samples lie inside the σunif -Ball.
The flexibility in setting rob enables CARRL to capture
uncertainties of various magnitudes in the input space, e.g.,
rob could be adapted on-line to account for a perturbation
magnitude that is unknown a priori, or to handle time-varying
sensor noise.
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B. Cartpole Domain
In the cartpole task [54], [57], the reward is the number of
time steps (capped at 200) that a pole remains balanced upright
(±12◦ from vertical) on a cart that can translate along a hori-
zontal track. The state vector, s =
[
pcart, vcart, θpole, θ˙pole
]T
and action space, a ∈ {push cart left,push cart right} are
defined in [54]. A 2-layer, 4-unit network was trained in an
environment without any observation perturbations using an
open-source DQN implementation [58] with Bayesian Opti-
mization used to find training hyperparameters. The trained
DQN is evaluated against perturbations of various magnitudes,
shown in Fig. 7. In this domain, robustness and perturbations
are applied to all states equally, i.e., adv = adv · 1 ∈ R4,
rob = rob · 1 ∈ R4 and σunif = σunif · 1 ∈ R4.
Each curve in Figs. 7a and 7c corresponds to the average
reward received under different magnitudes of adversarial,
or uniform noise perturbations, respectively. The reward of
a nominal DQN agent drops from 200 under perfect mea-
surements to 105 under adversarial perturbation of magnitude
adv = 0.075 (blue and red reward at x-axis, rob = 0 in Fig. 7a)
or to 145 under uniform noise of magnitude σunif = 0.5
(Fig. 7c). For rob > 0 (moving right along x-axis), the CARRL
algorithm considers an increasingly large range of states in its
worst-case outcome calculation. Accordingly, the algorithm is
able to recover some of the performance lost due to imperfect
observations. For example, with adv = 0.075 (red triangles),
CARRL achieves 200 reward using CARRL with rob = 0.1.
The ability to recover performance is due to CARRL selecting
actions that consider the worst-case state (e.g., a state in which
the pole is closest to falling), rather than fully trusting the
perturbed observations.
However, there is again tradeoff between robustness and
conservatism. For large values of rob, the average reward
declines steeply for all magnitudes of adversaries and noise,
because CARRL considers an excessively large set of worst-
case states (more detail provided in Section V-F).
The reward-maximizing choice of rob for a particular class
and magnitude of perturbations is explored in Figs. 7b and 7d.
Similarly to the collision avoidance domain, the best choice
of rob is close to adv under adversarial perturbations and less
than σunif under uniform noise perturbations.
These results use 200 random seeds causing different initial
conditions.
C. Computational Efficiency
For the cartpole task, one forward pass with bound calcu-
lation takes on average 0.68 ± 0.06ms, which compares to a
forward pass of the same DQN (nominal, without calculating
bounds) of 0.24 ± 0.03ms; for collision avoidance, it takes
1.85±1.62ms (CARRL) and 0.30±0.04ms (DQN), all on one
i7-6700K CPU. In our implementation, the bound of all actions
(i.e., 2 or 11 discrete actions for the cartpole and collision
avoidance domain, respectively) are computed in parallel.
While the DQNs used in this work are relatively small, [27]
shows that the runtime of Fast-Lin scales linearly with the
network size, and a recent GPU implementation offers faster
performance [59], suggesting CARRL could be implemented
in real-time for higher-dimensional RL tasks, as well.
D. Robustness to Behavioral Adversaries
In addition to observational perturbations, many real-world
domains also require interaction with other agents, whose
behavior could be adversarial. In the collision avoidance
domain, this can be modeled by an environment agent who
actively tries to collide with the CARRL agent, as opposed
to the various cooperative or neutral behavior models seen
in the training environment described earlier. Although the
CARRL formulation does not explicitly consider behavioral
adversaries, one can introduce robustness to this class of
adversarial perturbation through robustness in the observation
space, namely by specifying uncertainty in the other agent’s
position. In other words, requiring the CARRL agent to
consider worst-case positions of another agent while selecting
actions causes the CARRL agent to maintain a larger spacing,
which in turn prevents the adversarially behaving agent from
getting close enough to cause collisions.
In the collision avoidance domain, we parameterize the
adversarial “strength” by a collaboration coefficient, λ, where
λ = 0.5 corresponds to a nominal ORCA agent (that does
half the collision avoidance), λ = 0 corresponds to a non-
cooperative agent that goes straight toward its goal, and
λ ∈ [−1, 0) corresponds to an adversarially behaving agent.
Adversarially behaving agents sample from a Bernoulli distri-
bution (every 1 second) with parameter |λ|. If the outcome is
1, the adversarial agent chooses actions directly aiming into
the CARRL agent’s projected future position, otherwise, it
chooses actions moving straight toward its goal position. Thus,
λ = −1 means the adversarial agent is always trying to collide
with the CARRL agent.
The idea of using observational robustness to protect against
behavioral uncertainty is quantified in Fig. 8, where each curve
corresponds to a different behavioral adversary. Increasing the
magnitude of λ < 0 (increasingly strong adversaries) causes
collisions with increasing frequency, since the environment
transition model is increasingly different from what was seen
during training. Increasing CARRL’s robustness parameter rob
leads to a reduction in the number of collisions, as seen
in Fig. 8a. Accordingly, the reward received increases for
certain values of rob > 0 (seen strongest in red, violet curves;
note y-axis scale is wider than in Fig. 6b). Although the impact
on the reward function is not as large as in the observational
uncertainty case, Fig. 8c shows that the reward-maximizing
choice of rob has some negative correlation the adversary’s
strength (i.e., the defense should get stronger against a stronger
adversary).
The same trade-off of over-conservatism for large rob exists
in the behavioral adversary setting. Because there are perfect
observations in this experiment (just like training), CARRL
has minimal effect when the other agent is cooperative (blue,
λ = 0.5). The non-cooperative curve (orange, λ = 0) matches
what was seen in Fig. 6 with adv = 0 or σunif = 0. 100 test
cases with 5 seeds were used.
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Fig. 7: Results on Cartpole. CARRL recovers performance (measured by reward received) by adding robustness under various magnitudes
of adversarial (a) and uniform noise (c) perturbations. Each curve in (a,c) correspond to a different magnitude of perturbation, and rob = 0
corresponds to zero robustness, i.e., DQN. For all adversary/noise magnitudes, CARRL becomes overly conservative for large rob, and the
performance degrades. Thus, choosing the best rob for a particular perturbation magnitude can be guided by the curves in (b,d).
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Fig. 8: Robustness to Adversarial Behavior. Each curve shows a different magnitude of adversarial behavior of another agent in the collision
avoidance task. The adversarially behaving other agents (negative collaboration coefficient) are able to cause many collisions with a CARRL
agent trained among cooperative and non-cooperative agents. Although CARRL was not explicitly designed to handle behavioral adversaries,
CARRL can reduce the number of collisions by providing robustness in the other agent’s position measurement. CARRL’s effect on reward
(b) is not as strong as in Fig. 6, but the reward-maximizing rob > 0 against all adversaries (c), and there is a trend of larger rob working
well against stronger adversaries.
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Fig. 9: Greedy Convex Bounds vs. LP. Using efficient but greedy bounds on the adversarial polytope, CARRL’s action-selection produces
similar performance to that of action-selection using the less relaxed LP (cf. LP-ALL in [28]) (solid vs. dashed curves in each color). In
(c), CARRL and LP select identical actions on > 99% of timesteps (across 60 episodes) for small rob, but the two methods diverge as
the greedy bounds become overly conservative. Thus, for small-to-moderate rob, the extra computation required for the LP does not have
substantial effect on decision-making.
E. Comparison to LP Bounds
As described in Section II, the convex relaxation approaches
(e.g., Fast-Lin) provide relatively loose, but fast-to-compute
bounds on DNN outputs. Equation (17) relates various bound
tightnesses theoretically, which raises the question: how much
better would the performance of an RL agent be, given
more computation time to better approximate the worst-case
outcome, QL?
In Fig. 9, we compare the performance of an agent follow-
ing the CARRL decision rule, versus one that approximates
QL(sadv,a) with the full (non-greedy) primal convex relaxed
LP (in the collision avoidance domain with observational
perturbations). Our implementation is based on the LP-ALL
implementation provided in [28]. The key takeaway is that
there is very little difference: the CARRL curves are solid and
the LP curves are dashed, for various settings of adversarial
perturbation, adv. The small difference in the two algorithms is
explained by the fact that CARRL provides extra conservatism
versus the LP (CARRL accounts for a worse worst-case than
the LP), so the CARRL algorithm performs slightly better
when rob is set too small, and slightly worse when rob is
too large for the particular observational adversary.
This result is further explained by Fig. 9c, where it is
shown that CARRL and LP-based decision rules choose the
same action > 99% of the time for  < 0.1, meaning in this
experiment, the extra time spent computing the tighter bounds
has little impact on the RL agent’s decisions.
F. Intuition on Certified Bounds
Visual inspection of actual adversarial polytopes and the
corresponding efficiently computed bounds provides additional
intuition into the CARRL algorithm. The state uncertainty’s
mapping into an adversarial polytope in the Q-value space is
visualized in Figs. 10 and 11. In Fig. 10a, a CARRL agent
observes another agent (of the same size) positioned some-
where in the concentric, colored regions. The state uncertainty,
drawn for various values of rob with L∞ norm manifests
itself in Fig. 10b as a region of possible Q(sadv, aj) values,
for each action, aj . Because there are only two dimensions
of state uncertainty, we can exhaustively sample Q-values for
these states. To visualize the corresponding Q-value region in
2D, consider just two actions, a0, a5 (right-most and straight
actions, respectively).
The efficiently computed lower bounds, Ql for each action
are shown as dotted lines for each of the rob-Balls. Note that
for small rob (orange) the bounds are quite tight to the region
of possible Q-values. A larger rob region (blue) leads to looser
(but still useful) bounds, and this case also demonstrates rob
with non-uniform components (4 = 0.1, 5 = 0.2, where
(4, 5) are the indices of the other agent’s position in the state
vector) For large rob (green), the bounds are very loose, as the
lowest sampled Q-value for a0 is 0.3, but Ql(sadv, a0) = 0.16.
This increase in conservatism with rob is explained by the
formulation of Fast-Lin, in that linear bounds around an “un-
decided” ReLU become looser for larger input uncertainties.
That is, as defined in Eq. (3), the lower linear bound of an
undecided ReLU in layer k, neuron i is u
(k)
i ·l(k)i
u
(k)
i +l
(k)
i
< 0 for
z
(k)
i = l
(k)
i , whereas a ReLU can never output a negative
number. This under-approximation gets more extreme for large
rob,i, since u
(k)
i , l
(k)
i become further apart in the input layer,
and this conservatism is propagated through the rest of the
network. Per the discussion in [28], using the same slope for
the upper and lower bounds has computational advantages
but can lead to conservatism. The CROWN [28] algorithm
generalizes this notion and allows adaptation in the slopes;
connecting CROWN with CARRL is a minor change left for
future work.
Moreover, expanding the possible uncertainty magnitudes
without excessive conservatism and while maintaining com-
putational efficiency could be an area of future research.
Nonetheless, the lower bounds in CARRL were sufficiently
tight to be beneficial across many scenarios.
In addition to rob, Fig. 11a considers the impact of vari-
ations in sadv: when the other agent is closer to the CARRL
agent (purple), the corresponding Q-values in Fig. 11b are
lower for each action, than when the other agent is further
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(a) Position Uncertainty of Another Agent [m] (b) Corresponding Certified Bounds & Sampled DQN Outputs
Fig. 10: Influence of rob on Q-Values. In (a), the CARRL agent (©) has a goal (F) at (6,0) and decides between two actions, a0 and a5.
A second agent could be centered somewhere in the colored regions, corresponding to different values of rob. In (b) are the corresponding
Q-values for those possible states (orange, blue green regions in top-right), exhaustively sampled in each rob-Ball. As rob increases, the
spread of possible Q-values increases. CARRL’s lower bounds on each action, Ql(sadv, a0), Ql(sadv, a5), are depicted by the dotted lines.
Conservatism is measured by the gap between the dashed line and the left/bottom-most sampled point. For small rob (orange), the bounds
are tight; for moderate rob (blue) are moderately conservative, and for large rob (green), the linear approximation of ReLU degrades, causing
excessive conservatism.
(a) Position Uncertainty of Another Agent [m] (b) Corresponding Certified Bounds & Sampled DQN Outputs
Fig. 11: Influence of sadv on Q-Values. For the same rob, the spread of Q-values are shown for two examples of sadv. When the other agent
is close (purple), the Q-values are lower than when the other agent is far (red). A closer look at one of the non-convex adversarial polytopes
is inset in (b). Moreover, if one instead used the heuristic of simply inflating the other agent’s radius, the Q-values would lie at the ×’s –
in both cases, radius inflation is more conservative (further toward bottom-left) than CARRL.
away (red). Note that the shape of the adversarial polytope
(region of Q-value) can be quite complicated due to the high
dimensionality of the DNN (inset of Fig. 11b). Furthermore,
the × symbols correspond to the Q-value if the agent simply
inflated the other agent’s radius to account for the whole
region of uncertainty. This heuristic is highly conservative
(and domain-specific), as the ×’s have lower Q-values than
the efficiently computed lower bounds for each action in these
examples.
VI. FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In laying a foundation for certified adversarial robustness in
deep RL, this work offers numerous future research directions
in connecting deep RL algorithms and real-world, safety-
critical systems.
For example, extensions of CARRL to other RL tasks will
raise the question: how does the robustness analysis extend to
continuous action spaces? When adv is unknown, as in our
empirical results, how could rob be tuned efficiently online
while maintaining robustness guarantees? How can the online
robustness estimates account for uncertainties from the training
process (e.g., unexplored states) in a guaranteed manner?
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The key factor in the performance of robustness algorithms
is the ability to precisely describe the uncertainty over which to
be robust. This work provides the rob, prob hyperparameters to
describe various shapes and sizes of uncertainties in different
dimensions of the observation space and shows how this
description could be applied under non-uniform, probabilistic
uncertainties or a model of behavioral uncertainty. However,
real-world systems also include other types of environmental
uncertainties. For instance, observational uncertainties beyond
Lp balls could be studied for certifiably robust defenses in
deep RL (e.g., [60], [61] in supervised learning). Moreover,
how can one protect against an adversary that is allowed to
plan n timesteps into the future (e.g., extending [62] to model-
free RL)?
Understanding each of these areas of extension will be cru-
cial in providing both performance and robustness guarantees
for deep RL algorithms deployed on real-world systems.
VII. CONCLUSION
This work adapted deep RL algorithms for application in
safety-critical domains, by proposing an add-on certifiably
robust defense to address existing failures under adversari-
ally perturbed observations and sensor noise. The proposed
extension of robustness analysis tools from the verification
literature into a deep RL formulation enabled efficient calcu-
lation of a lower bound on Q-values, given the observation
perturbation/uncertainty. These guaranteed lower bounds were
used to efficiently solve a robust optimization formulation
for action selection to provide maximum performance under
worst-case observation perturbations. Moreover, the resulting
policy comes with a certificate of solution quality, even though
the true state and optimal action are unknown to the certifier
due to the perturbations. The resulting policy (added onto
trained DQN networks) was shown to improve robustness to
adversaries and sensor noise, causing fewer collisions in a
collision avoidance domain and higher reward in cartpole.
Furthermore, the proposed algorithm was demonstrated in
the presence of adversaries in the behavior space, compared
against a more time-intensive alternative, and visualized for
particular scenarios to provide intuition on the algorithm’s
conservatism.
APPENDIX
CERTIFIED VS. VERIFIED TERMINOLOGY
Now that we have introduced our algorithm, we can more
carefully describe what we mean by a certifiably robust
algorithm.
First, we clarify what it means to be verified. In the context
of neural network robustness, a network is verified robust for
some nominal input if no perturbation within some known set
can change the network’s decision from its nominal decision.
A complete verification algorithm would correctly label the
network as either verified robust or verified non-robust for
any nominal input and perturbation set. In practice, verification
algorithms often involve network relaxations, and the resulting
algorithms are sound (any time the network gives an answer,
the answer is true), but sometimes return that they can not
verify either property.
A certificate is some piece of information that allows an
algorithm to quantify its solution quality. For example, [63]
uses a dual feasible point as a certificate to bound the primal
solution, which allows one to compute a bound on any feasible
point’s suboptimality even when the optimal value of the
primal problem is unknown. When an algorithm provides a
certificate, the literature commonly refers to the algorithm
as certified, certifiable, or certifiably (if it provides
a certificate of -ness).
In this work, we use a robust optimization formulation to
consider worst-case possibilities on state uncertainty (Eqs. (9)
and (10)); this makes our algorithm robust. Furthermore, we
provide a certificate on how sub-optimal the robust action
recommended by our algorithm is, with respect to the optimal
action at the (unknown) true state (Eq. (20)). Thus, we describe
our algorithm as certifiably robust or that it provides certified
adversarial robustness.
As an aside, some works in computer vision/robot per-
ception propose certifiably correct algorithms [64], [65]. In
those settings, there is often a combinatorial problem that
could be solved optimally with enough computation time, but
practitioners prefer an algorithm that efficiently computes a
(possibly sub-optimal) solution and comes with a certificate
of solution quality. Our setting differs; the state uncertainty
means that recovering the optimal action for the true state
is not a matter of computation time. Thus, we do not aim
for correctness (choosing the optimal action for the true
state), but rather choose an action that maximizes worst-case
performance.
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